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Article
The Sterilization Of Incompetents
and the "Late Probate Court"
in California: How Bad Law
Makes Hard Cases
B. ABBOTT GOLDBERG*
In law, as in genetics, a mistake in conception can produce a
monster. Because there is no statute expressly authorizing them to
do so, for more than a decade California courts refused to authorize
the sterilization of an incompetent even though such sterilization
would have been in the incompetent's best interest. These holdings
were based on the misconception that the Superior Court sitting in
probate had only the authority expressly granted by statute, and,
when so sitting, it could not exercise its general equitable authority.
In 1985, when the California Supreme Court held that such steriliza-
tions could be authorized, it did not expressly correct the jurisdic-
tional bases of the prior holdings. Thus it is conceivable that an
attempt may be made to reassert them. There are statutes allowing
the courts to authorize the medical treatment of incompetents, but
there are no statutes expressly allowing the withholding or withdrawal
of such treatment. So the argument could be made that the treat-
ment of incompetents must be instituted or continued even when
* Judge of the Superior Court, Retired; Scholar in Residence, McGeorge School of
Law, University of the Pacific, Sacramento, California.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
there is no hope of meaningful recovery. Examination of the hist6ry
of probate jurisdiction in California and demonstration of the er-
rors that result from ignoring or suppressing that history show how
the misconception arose and that it should no longer be applied.
A judicial opinion can be remarkable not only for what it says,
but also for what it does not say. Conservatorship of Valerie N.'
is an example. On its face Valerie is simply a holding that under
both the federal and state constitutions, an incompetent female may
not be deprived of the opportunity to be sterilized when sterili-
zation is necessary to her "habilitation, ' ' 2 and that paragraph (d)
of Probate Code section 2356 "may not be invoked to deny the
probate court authority to grant a conservator [or guardian] the
power to consent to sterilization. . .. -3 Unless one looks beneath
the surface, Valerie appears to be no more than the California
counterpart of the relatively recent cases holding that, despite the
absence of specific statutory authority, a trial court Which has gen-
eral equitable jurisdiction has authority to permit the sterilization
of an incompetent.4 These cases declined to follow what had pre-
viously been considered the weight of authority that courts had no
jurisdiction to authorize sterilization of an incompetent unless a
positive statutory grant of authority existed. Two California cases,
Guardianship of Kemp5 and Guardianship of Tulley,6 were impor-
1. 40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d 760, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1985) (4-3 decision).
2. Id. at 160-61, 165, 707 P.2d at 771-72, 775, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 399, 402. The
opinion uses "habilitation" to mean either or both conduct "to maximize the human po-
tential for the developmentally disabled even though he or she may never be employable,"
and "freedom to pursue a fulfilling life." Id. at 157 n.19, 163, 165, 168, 707 P.2d at 769
n.19, 773, 775, 776, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 396 n.19, 400, 402, 404.
3. 40 Cal. 3d at 168, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404. The statute reads: "No
ward or conservatee may be sterilized under the provisions of this division." CAL. PROD.
CODE § 2356, (d) (,Vest 1981). "This division" means division 4 of the Code, "Guard-
ianship, Conservatorship, and Other Protective Proceedings."
4. In re Guardianship of Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 232, 608 P.2d 635, 638 (1980) is
the first clear holding from a state court of last resort. See also In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d
607, 611 (Alaska 1981); P.S. by Harbin v. W.S., 452 N.E.2d 969, 975 (Ind. 1983); Wentzel
v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685, 701-02, 447 A.2d 1244, 1252-53 (1982); In
re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 562, 432 N.E.2d 712, 718 (1982); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 258-
62, 426 A.2d 467, 479-81 (1981); In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 576-
78, 307 N.W.2d 881, 898-99 (1981) (public policy held to make exercise of jurisdiction
"inappropriate"). Contra Anonymous v. Anonymous, 469 So. 2d 588 (Ala. 1985); Hudson
v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310 (Ala. 1979).
5. 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974).
6. Guardianship of Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 701, 704, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266, 268,
270 (1978) (jurisdiction is not to be inferred from "general principles of common law" or
"the canons of equity jurisprudence").
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tant, perhaps the principal, statements of the prior rule. The only
reference to them in Valerie, however, is in a quotation from the
comment of the California Law Revision Commission to its pro-
posal of Probate Code section 2356.1 Thus, Valerie overrules Kemp
and Tulley only inferentially rather than expressly.
Valerie's failure to expressly overrule Kemp and Tulley is dis-
concerting. As a matter of logic, invalidating the prohibition on
the exercise of jurisdiction in Probate Code section 2356(d) is no
more a grant of jurisdiction than disbelief of negative evidence is
proof of the converse positive.8 But more than logical niceties were
involved in Valerie. The court of appeal had declined to follow
the more recent authorities, had adhered to the existing California
position, and had held that even if Probate Code section 2356(d)
was unconstitutional, the sterilization could not have been author-
ized because: "In California ... jurisdiction and powers of the
probate court are 'wholly statutory' [citing Kemp], and no statute
authorizes the court to order sterilization." 9 The California Su-
preme Court affirmed the denial of the conservator's petition, not
on the jurisdictional grounds followed in both the trial and ap-
pellate courts, but on the ground that the record contained no
evidence that sterilization was required. Noting that when a decision
is correct the fact that its reasoning is wrong is irrelevant, the
supreme court concluded: "The affirmance is, however, without
prejudice to a renewed application for additional powers at such
time as appellants have available adequate supporting evidence."' 0
Thus, what Valerie calls the "probate court"" now has jurisdiction
to entertain a conservator's or guardian's petition for sterilization
of a ward. This conclusion is to be inferred from, rather than
expressed in or explained by, the majority opinion. Nevertheless,
7. 40 Cal. 3d at 154-55, 707 P.2d at 767, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
8. Cf. Edmonson v. State Bar, 29 Cal. 3d 339, 343, 625 P.2d 812, 814, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 899, 901 (1981). The supreme court did not refer to CAL. PROB. CODE § 2357 (West
1981) (court ordered medical treatment), let alone consider it as a basis of jurisdiction. See
infra, text accompanying notes 176-92.
9. Conservatorship of Nieto, 199 Cal. Rptr. 478, 483 (1984). This was the case name
in the California Reporter advance sheets. In the bound volume the case name was changed
by substituting Valerie N. for Nieto. The original name is used in this paper to avoid
confusing the appellate opinion with subsequent Supreme Court opinion which is also cap-
tioned Valerie N. Retention of the original name, Nieto, may be irregular, but it should
do no harm as the appellate opinions can no longer be discovered except by archeological
excavation. They have been removed from the ordinary channels of legal research. Infra,
note 13.
10. 40 Cal. 3d at 169, 707 P.2d at 778, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
11. E.g., 40 Cal. 3d at 147, 168, 707 P.2d at 761-62, 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 388-89,
404.
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the conclusion is not questioned in either of the dissenting opinions,
which would have denied the incompetent in Valerie a constitu-
tional right to have "substituted consent" to sterilization exercised
on her behalf.'
2
The supreme court's silence on the jurisdiction of the "probate
court" must have been deliberate, because the subject had been
canvassed in the court of appeal. In an opinion, commendable not
only for its content but also for its candor, the dissenting court
of appeal justice in Valerie concluded that the state was consti-
tutionally required to provide a forum in which a substituted choice
could be made for the incompetent, 3 and that the state had done
so by giving the superior court general equitable jurisdiction over
guardianships. 4 But the reasons for this deliberate silence are open
to conjecture.
THE DUTY TO PROVIDE A FORUM WITHIN
WHICH TO EXERCISE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
In the Supreme Court the minority could have taken the estab-
lished California approach and simply denied jurisdiction, but they
may have been mindful of the adverse criticisms of Kemp and
Tulley. These criticisms were that disposition of the case on juris-
dictional grounds appeared to be an attempted "abdication of the
judicial function,"' 5 an effort to "escape the demands of judging
12. 40 Cal. 3d at 171 (Lucas, J., dissenting), 175 (Bird, C.J., dissenting), 707 P.2d at
779, 781-82, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 406, 408-09.
13. Conservatorship of Nieto, 199 Cal. Rptr. 478, 487 (1984) (Sims, J., dissenting).
Justice Sims' "commendable candor" appears from the following: "A rehearing was granted
in this case to enable this writer to review material in supplemental briefs which, through
inadvertence, I had not perused prior to the time I approved the majority opinion, and to
give me an opportunity to reexamine the principles enunciated in that opinion." 199 Cal.
Rptr. at 486.
Because the California Supreme Court granted a hearing, the opinion of the court of
appeal was banished from the official reports and cannot "be cited or relied on." CAL.
CIV. & CRIM. Cr. R. 976 (d), 977 (a). The West Publishing Co. now participates in this
obliteration. The table of cases, 191 Cal. Rptr. XXVI, lists Conservatorship of Valerie N.,
191 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1983), the first appellate opinion. Between the first and second appellate
opinions, the publishing company appears to have changed its practice. The table of cases,
199 Cal. Rptr. XXIII, XXV, does not list the second appellate opinion under either the
name Valerie nor Nieto. West's California Digest 2d omits the two appellate opinions both
from the digest proper and the table of cases. Apparently somebody is trying to show that
Congressman (later President) James A. Garfield was wrong when he said: "[M]y colleague
can make but he cannot unmake history." See, Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1, 60 n.115 (1955).
14. 199 Cal. Rptr. at 493-94. "Insofar as it [CAL PROa. CODE § 2356 (d)] may limit
the jurisdiction of the probate court, it cannot prevent the superior court from asserting
its general jurisdiction to enforce a constitutional right." 199 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
15. In re Guardianship of Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 231, 608 P.2d 635, 637 (1980).
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or of making.... difficult appraisals,' 1 6 or to "thwart ... the
search for a remedy to enforce a constitutional right of choice by
a thicket of procedural complexities which attempts to stifle that
search because of lack of a forum.""
Or the minority could have taken the approach of the Wisconsin
court which embroiled itself in the paradox of recognizing that
even if "the right to procreate or to prevent procreation is a pro-
tected, fundamental personal decision,"' 8 the court could properly
refuse to enforce it because the legislature had not yet determined
the state's public policy. The Wisconsin majority rationalized their
inaction by analogizing it to their refusal to recognize the tort of
wrongful birth.' 9 The California minority may have recognized and
sought to avoid the error of the Wisconsin majority: failure to
realize that refusing to create a new nonconstitutional cause of
action is not analogous to refusing to enforce an existing consti-
tutional right.20 Additionally, if the California minority had wished
to assert discretionary authority to refuse to exercise jurisdiction
on public policy grounds, they would have had to distinguish the
prior California cases holding that the existence of state jurisdiction
to enforce federal rights should be exercised.
2'
Another possible, but unsatisfactory, approach might have been
to argue that since no act of Congress requires state courts to
enforce the federal right of personal decision to procreate or pre-
vent procreation, the state is free to deny its courts jurisdiction to
enforce that right, 22 and, therefore, Probate Code section 2356 (d)
is valid. Such an argument would ignore two facts: (1) despite the
probate code section the courts could authorize sterilization; and
(2) a remedy cannot be denied because it arises under a federal
16. Id. See also In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 611 (Alaska 1981). Cf. In re Guardianship
of Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 593, 307 N.W.2d 881, 906 (1981) (dissenting opinion).
17. Conservatorship of Nieto, 199 Cal. Rptr. 478, 488 (1984) (Sims, J., dissenting).
18. In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 562-63, 307 N.W.2d 881, 892
(1981).
19. 102 Wis. 2d at 576, 307 N.W.2d at 898.
20. Cf. Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1 (1912) supporting ab-
olition of the fellow-servant rule, making violation of a statute negligence and instituting
comparative negligence by citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877) ("A person has
no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law ... ").
21. Brown v. Pitchess, 13 Cal. 3d 518, 523, 531 P.2d 772, 775, 119 Cal. Rptr. 204,
207 (1975) ("[T]he existence of concurrent jurisdiction creates the duty to exercise it.");
Miller v. Municipal Court, 22 Cal. 2d 818, 851, 142 P.2d 297, 316 (1943) ("The existence
of the jurisdiction creates an implication of the duty to exercise it, and that its exercise
may be onerous does not militate against that implication.").
22. Cf. Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 189 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The
Constitution does not require New York to give jurisdiction to its courts against its will").
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right. 23 Although the language of the Probate Code section 2356(d)
is unqualified, it had not been applied to prohibit all sterilizations
of wards or conservatees, but had been interpreted to allow ster-
ilizations needed to avoid "an unreasonable risk of death. ' 24 Thus
the remedy of sterilization was available in California courts with-
out specific statutory authority, 25 and since the remedy was avail-
able it must be afforded to vindicate the federal right. 26 Denial of
the remedy amounts to deprivation of a federal constitutional right
of choice which deserves as good a remedy as that afforded the
state or federal right of health in Maxon v. Superior Court.
27
The majority's silence on jurisdiction in Valerie is harder to ex-
plain. It may seem obvious that once the majority found that an
incompetent had a constitutional right of procreative choice, a ju-
dicial remedy to vindicate that right must exist. This reasoning is
not obvious at all, however, when viewed in the context of the
tortuous history .of probate jurisdiction in California. 2  For exam-
ple, Kemp did hold, just as prior cases indicated, that when the
superior court sits in probate "its jurisdiction and powers are wholly
23. Id. "[T]he state courts . . . are to act in conformity with their general principles
of practice and procedure and are not to deny jurisdiction merely because the right of
action arises under the act of Congress."
24. Maxon v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 626, 634, 185 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521
(1982).
25. Maxon summarized Kemp as holding: "that the superior court sitting as a probate
court was a court of limited jurisdiction and that, in the absence of statutory authority, it
lacked jurisdiction to order the involuntary sterilization of a severly impaired ward." 135
Cal. App. 3d at 633, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 520. Without contradicting this, Maxon proceeded
to hold there was authority to authorize sterilization without explaining the source of the
authority, thereby anticipating the similar silence in Valerie.
26. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n.7 (1980). The Martinez court stated:
"[W]here the same type of claim, if arising under state law, would be enforced in the state
courts, the state courts are generally not free to refuse enforcement of the federal claim."
See also Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 390, 391, 392 (1947) ("power and duty" of state
courts to enforce federal laws). Cf. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642-43 (1935) (a
state may not "under the guise of merely affecting the remedy, deny enforcement of claims
otherwise within the protection of the full faith and credit clause, when its courts have
general jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties").
27. Cf. Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 840, 548 P.2d 1125, 1129, 129 Cal. Rptr.
453, 457 (1976) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring));
Modern Barber Col. v. California Emp. Stab. Comm'n, 31 Cal. 2d 720, 728, 192 P.2d 916
(1948) ("[I]f the right to be vindicated is one granted by the Constitution, an injunction
may be granted regardless of the statute if injunction is an appropriate remedy, because
the right is one which the Legislature cannot abridge").
28. It was certainly not obvious in 1984. Consider the following:
Tulley and Kemp [hold] that the law of California does not vest a probate
court with jurisdiction to authorize or order sterilization. We may therefore follow
Tulley and Kemp in the present case, and affirm the order under review, without
regard to appellants' constitutional challenge of the statute [CAL PROD. CODE §
2356, (d) (West 1981)].
Conservatorship of Nieto, 199 Cal. Rptr. 478, 482 (1984).
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statutory.' '29 But Kemp went further and held "[t]he probate court
has exclusive jurisdiction of guardianship proceedings,' '30 a prop-
osition that Kemp and later cases applied to prevent the superior
court from exercising equitable powers on behalf of an incompe-
tent. 3'
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE PROBATE COURT IN CALIFORNIA
Although the words and application of the above proposition
seem sensible, in fact they were and are so wrong that it is hard
to decide where to attack them first. For sake of simplicity, view
Kemp and its progeny as a syllogism:
The probate court has jurisdiction of guardianships.
The jurisdiction of the probate court is exclusive.
Therefore the superior court can exercise no authority in a
guardianship.
There has not been a probate court as such in California for
more than a century. The probate court is gone, 32 and has been
gone since 1879. 31 As early as 1881 the probate court was funereally
described as "the late Probate Court."13 4 Nevertheless, the expres-
sion "probate court" has persisted in California cases and other
legal writing since 1879. "But no harm is done where it is under-
stood that such reference is to the superior court sitting in the
exercise of its probate jurisdiction," says the court in Schlyen v.
Schlyen.35 The corollary, of course, is that harm is done if the
29. Guardianship of Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 760, 761, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64, 66 (1974);
Maxon v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 626, 633, 185 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520 (1982);
Conservatorship of Nieto, 199 Cal. Rptr. 478, 481, 483 (1984).
30. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 761, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
31. Guardianship of Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 705, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266, 270 (1978).
[A]ppellant's argument [that the superior court had "equity power to serve and
promote the interest and welfare of the incompetent"] must fail for the reason
that the purported invocation of the equity power of the superior court must be
deemed null and void. It is well established that the probate court has exclusive
jurisdiction of guardianship proceedings....
Conservatorship of Nieto, 199 Cal. Rptr. 478, 483 (1984) (authority can not be derived
from state constitution or inherent equitable powers because "jurisdiction and powers of
the probate court are 'wholly statutory' . .. ").
32. Estate of Davis, 136 Cal. 590, 597, 69 P. 412, 414 (1902).
33. Schlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal. 2d 361, 369-72, 273 P.2d 897, 900-03 (1954) (historical
account); Estate of Davis, 136 Cal. 590, 597, 69 P. 412, 414 (1902) ("[Tlhere is no probate
court in the sense that the term has been used in the earlier volumes of the California
reports"); see also R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 178 (1940).
34. Theller v. Such, 57 Cal. 447, 450 (1881).
35. 43 Cal. 2d at 375, 273 P.2d at 904; 11 CAL. JUR. Executors and Administrators
§ 26, at 240-41 nn.17-18 (1923) (acknowledging but following erroneous custom and practice
of referring to "probate court" and "probate judge").
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expression "probate court" is given its literal meaning. Despite its
citation of Schlyen,36 giving "probate court" unsupported and un-
supportable significance is exactly what Kemp did. On the basis of
Schlyen the major premise of the Kemp syllogism can be restated:
The superior court sitting in probate has jurisdiction of guardi-
anships.
Neither the source nor the significance of the qualification, "sit-
ting in probate," are immediately apparent. Since 1880, and 1974
when Kemp was decided, and to this day, the statutes have pro-
vided only that guardianships and, more recently, conservatorships
are within the jurisdiction of the "superior court. 37 No statutory
basis for Kemp's expression "sitting in probate"3" has been found.
But for many years guardianships had been generally regarded as
probate proceedings because the statutes relative to guardianships
were "embraced within the same title [of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure] as relates to proceedings in estates of decedents." 3 9 The
court, however, recognized that, because of the need to protect a
ward,40 the analogy between estates and trusts on the one hand
and guardianships on the other should not be pressed too far.41 In
36. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 761, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
37. 1880 Cal. Amendment to the Codes, Code of Civil Procedure, ch. 74, at 65, §
1747 (minors), at 67, § 1763 (incompetents), superseded in 1931 by CAL. PROB. CODE §
1405, (enacted by 1931 Cal. Stat. ch. 281, at 670) (both minors and incompetents). As
amended by 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 1459, at 3753, the version effective at the time of Kemp,
§ 1405 still read substantially as its predecessors: "The superior court shall appoint a general
guardian of the person ... of minors and insane or incompetent persons ... ." Now CAL.
PROD. CODE § 2200 (West 1981): "The superior court has jurisdiction of guardianship and
conservatorship proceedings."
38. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 761, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
39. Estate of Dunphy, 158 Cal. 1, 3, 109 P. 627, (1910) (prematurity of appeal in
guardianship determined by reference to statutes relative to decedents' estates rather than
those relative to civil actions because of former Code of Civil Procedure § 1808 (now CAL.
PROD. CODE § 2100 (West 1981)), although "[n]o valid reason can be urged" for the difference),
158 Cal. at 5, 109 P. at 629. See infra, note 96.
Dunphy's reference to the title in the Code of Civil Procedure illustrates one reason for
persistence of the expressions "probate court" and "probate judge." As enacted in 1872,
when there were Probate Courts and Probate Judges, Part III, Title XI of the Code of
Civil Procedure read "Of Proceedings in Probate Courts." But when the operative sections
of the code were amended in 1880 to reflect the changes effected by the Constitution of
1879, supra, note 37, the title was not altered. Indeed, the title referring to the nonexistent
courts survived the removal of the operative section from the Code of Civil Procedure to
the Probate Code. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE (Deering 1931) at 680. Perhaps to celebrate
the centennial of its substantive, if not literal, demise, the title was finally repealed in 1979.
1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 373, §§ 556-606, at 1426-28.
40. Guardianship of DiCarlo, 3 Cal. 2d 225, 235, 44 P.2d 562, 567 (1935). The court
defined a ward as: "a person under legal disability and ordinarily unable to protect himself
against overreaching or other improper conduct of the guardian . . ." Id.
41. Guardianship of DiCarlo, 3 Cal. 2d 225, 234-35, 44 P.2d 562, 566-67 (1935) (unlike
intermediate or current accounts of executors or trustees, those of guardians are not res
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1974 a rule of the Judicial Council did require the presiding judge
of the superior court in the larger counties "to designate one or
more departments to conduct the proceedings in . . . probate
cases.' '42 The Council's old rules that, in certain counties, guard-
ianships and probate proceedings should be assigned to the same
departments 43 had been long superseded. Various local rules pro-
vide, as they have for many years, that guardianships and con-
servatorships are assigned to probate departments." These rules,
however, concern only the distribution of business within the court
and have no jurisdictional significance except in situations involving
a judge in one department improperly interfering in a matter as--
signed to another department, or attempting to exercise jurisdiction
outside the scope of the pending proceeding.45
The identification of guardianships with probate matters is ex-
plained by history rather than logic. The original California con-
stitution of 1849 followed a then common pattern of providing a
separate probate jurisdiction. 46 This device was designed to elimi-
nate the traditional distinctions among the ecclesiastical, common-
law, and chancery jurisdictions and provide a readily accessible
forum to handle what are largely administrative matters. 47 The first
legislature also followed this pattern, and appended guardianships
judicata despite approval by the "probate court"). Compare In re Bundy, 44 Cal. App.
466, 467-68, 186 P. 811, 812 (1919) (applicant for letters of guardianship allowed attorney's
fee because acting in interest of ward).
42. CA. Crv. & CRIM. CT. R. 247 (West 1981) (repealed 1985). See now id. 214 (West
Supp. 1986): "Except as otherwise provided by law, the business of the [superior] court
shall be distributed by the presiding judge."
43. E.g., SUPER. CT. R., XXII, XXIV, 8, 204 Cal. lxxviii, lxxxii (1929).
44. E.g., Los Angeles County Probate Policy Memorandum, § 18 (guardianships), § 19.
(conservatorships), and San Francisco Probate Manual 1.03, 12.01-12.06. The local rules are
collected in CA. CONTINUING ED. OF THE BAR California Local Probate Rules (7th ed.
1986).
45. 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts, §§ 184-89 (3d ed. 1985). The prop-
osition is no novelty. The authorities cited antedate Kemp by at least several years. Note
the following: "Where, by statute, a distinct subject matter jurisdiction has been given to
a special department or 'court,' e.g., Probate ...." id. § 185, at 209; and "The Probate
Court ... exercise[s] a special statutory jurisdiction ... " id. at 210. Despite these state-
ments, Witkin cites no statute referring to the probate department, and the writer has found
none. The probate department or court exists only by virtue of rules adopted for convenience
in the distribution and handling of the superior court's business. Schylen v. Schylen, 43
Cal. 2d 361, 370-72, 273 P.2d 897, 901-03 (1954).
46. CA. Co NsT. OF 1849, art. VI, § 8 ("He [the County Judge] shall ... perform the
duties of Surrogate, or Probate Judge."). Simes & Basye, The Organization of the Probate
Court in America (pt. 1), 42 MIcH. L. REv. 65, 977-82 (1944).
47. R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 140, 179 (1940); Simes & Basye, supra note
46, 42 MICH. L. Rv. at 976.
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of both infants and other incompetents to the probate jurisdiction.48
Traditionally, "[g]uardianship was in the jurisdiction of chancery
over infants, lunatics and idiots, ' 49 and its addition to probate
jurisdiction was recognized as an innovation which did not oust
the old District Court of its equitable powers over guardianships5 0
Unlike chancery, however, the old Probate Court was an "in-
ferior court" which could not take jurisdiction or administer rem-
edies unless provided by statute." At first the Probate Court may
have been inferior in fact52 as well as in the legal hierarchy. The
old District Courts had unlimited jurisdiction in all issues of fact
joined in the probate courts 5 3 a situation once described as leaving
the Probate Courts "as the mere registers of the decisions of the
District Courts. 5 4 Because of their inferior status, Probate Courts
were not courts of record and their proceedings were not entitled
to the ordinary presumptions of jurisdiction. As a result, "no busi-
ness depending on letters testamentary or of administration could
be safely transacted." 55 This rule was found intolerable. 6 It was
abolished in 1858 by an act to give to the proceedings of courts
of probate the same effect as courts of general jurisdiction, and
in 1862 the constitution was amended to conform to the act.5 7
These steps, however, "still left the probate court a separate and
special tribunal which did not have full probate jurisdiction,''8
because the constitution provided that the Probate Judges should
48. 1850 Cal. Stat. ch. 115, §§ 23, 24, 35; 1851 Cal. Stat. ch. I, §§ 78, 81. R. POUND,
supra note 47, at 136; Simes & Basye, supra note 46, 42 MICH. L. REV. at 980; id. (pt.
2), 43 MICH. L. REV. 113, 131-32 (1944).
49. R. POUND, supra note 47, at 136; Simes & Basye, supra note 46 (pt. 2).
50. Wilson v. Roach, 4 Cal. 362 (1854):
The District Courts of this State have the same control over the persons of
minors, as well as their estates, that the Courts of Chancery in England possess.
This jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution, and cannot be divested by any
legislative enactment .... The claim of exclusive original jurisdiction in the Courts
of Probate over this subject is unfounded. Chancery may at any time interfere,
and remove the proceedings before it.
Id. at 366-67. See also Robinson v. Fair, 128 U.S. 53, 86 (1888); In re Vedder, I Labatt
246 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 1857). But see Toland v. Earl, 129 Cal. 148, 153-54, 61 P. 914, 915
(190) (after the superior court had both probate and equity jurisdiction).
51. Grimes Estate v. Norris, 6 Cal. 621, 622 (1856).
52. R. POUND, supra note 47, at 140, 179.
53. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. VI, § 6 (1862).
54. In re Will of Bowen, 34 Cal. 682, 689 (1868).
55. Irwin v. Schriber, 18 Cal. 499, 504 (1861).
56. Burris v. Kennedy, 108 Cal. 331, 337-38, 41 P. 458, 459 (1895).
57. 1858 Cal. Stat. ch. 120, at 95; later acknowledged sub silentio in CAL. CONST. OF
1849, art VI, § 6 (1862), which deleted the clause giving the District Courts jurisdiction
over matters of fact joined in the Probate Courts.
58. Burris v. Kennedy, 108 Cal. 331, 338, 41 P. 458, 459 (1895).
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perform only duties prescribed by law-no law, no duty or au-
thority.
59
THE EQUITABLE AND INCIDENTAL AUTHORITY OF THE SUPERIOR
COURT IN PROBATE AND GUARDlANsHP MATTERS
The dictum, "[i]n the constitution of 1879 all this was changed,''
6
was unduly sanguine. Granted, in 1879 the Probate Court as such
was abolished and the Superior Court was given "original juris-
diction in all cases in equity .. .[and] of all matters of probate."
6'
Since this gave probate jurisdiction to the highest court in the state
having general common-law jurisdiction, it scotched any remnant
of the notion that probate decrees were particularly vulnerable to
collateral attack. 62 But because of the constitutional separation be-
tween probate and other jurisdictions of the Superior Court, the
pre-1879 limitation that the former Probate Court could not "take
jurisdiction or administer remedies other than those given, and in
the manner provided by statute' 63 remained almost intact and was
applied to probate matters in the Superior CourtA4 For example,
the old Probate Court had no statutory authority to cite the ad-
ministrator of a deceased administrator to settle the account of the
deceased in the estate for which he was responsible. But the new
administrator of the estate was not without remedies; an action in
equity against the administrator of the deceased administrator was
59. CAL. CowsT. oF 1849, art. VI, § 8 (1862); Bush v. Lindsay, 44 Cal. 121, 125 (1872).
60. Burris v. Kennedy, 108 Cal. 331, 338, 41 P. 458, 459 (1895).
61. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1879), now § 10 as amended in 1966 ("superior courts
have original jurisdiction in all causes except those given by statute to other trial courts.").
62. Burris v. Kennedy, 108 Cal. 331, 338, 41 P. 458, 459 (1895) ("The same pre-
sumption must now attach to decrees in probate proceedings upon collateral attack as to
judgments in cases at common law or in equity .... ).
63. Grimes Estate v. Norris, 6 Cal. 621, 622 (1856). See supra note 51.
64. Estate of Davis, 136 Cal. 590, 597, 69 P. 412, 414-15 (1902):
It may be said that the probate court is gone, but that the probate jurisdiction
remains .... Yet the probate jurisdiction of the superior court is different from
its law and equity jurisdiction in this-it is essentially a jurisdiction under the
control of the state legislature. That law making power may enlarge it or may
restrict it [and].... the procedure by which that jurisdiction may be invoked....
Id.
One advance was that if the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
person, a matter improperly brought in probate could be treated as a proceeding in equity,
because "the same tribunal exercises equity and probate jurisdiction." In re Thompson, 101
Cal. 349, 354, 35 P. 991, 992, modified, 36 P. 98, 508 (1894). See also Guardianship of
Wells, 140 Cal. 349, 352, 73 P. 1065, 1066 (1903). But this rule was not applied in Davis
because the defendants came into court only in "answer to a citation, a process entirely
unlike a summons, ... [and] by their appearance, defendants did not submit themselves
to the jurisdiction of a court of equity, but alone to the jurisdiction of the superior court
in a matter of probate." 136 Cal. at 598, 69 P. at 415.
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available. 6 Despite the constitutional changes of 1879, this cum-
bersome procedural necessity survived until 1905 when a statutd
provided that the executor or administrator of a deceased executor
or administrator could present accounts "to the court" (more prop-
erly in the proceeding) in which the estate was being administered.
This statute transformed the equity proceeding from a necessity to
an impropriety because an adequate remedy now existed, and "the
foundation of the equity jurisdiction [was] gone.'' 66
A continuing example of the need to resort to an equity pro-
ceeding in probate affairs is seen when a final decree in a probate
proceeding is attacked for extrinsic fraud. Such an attack cannot
be made by motion in the probate proceeding unless it appears on
the face of the judgment roll that the court had no jurisdiction.
Of course, the alleged fraud will not usually be so apparent. There-
fore, if a final decree in probate was procured by extrinsic fraud,
the facts must be shown by a separate suit in equity. 67 The genesis
of this requirement is stated as follows:
[T]he jurisdiction ... to distribute the assets of an estate is vested
exclusively in the probate court, under proceedings in rem, strictly
defined by statute. It is a matter of gravest doubt, therefore, whether
it is within the power of a court of equity in this state to set aside
a decree of distribution so given by a court having exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the matter.' 8
The courts of equity therefore devised the remedy of a suit in
personam against the beneficiary of the fraud to impose a con-
structive trust on him, thus preserving the "exclusive jurisdiction"
of the probate court by leaving the probate decree intact and pro-
tecting those who had relied on it in good faith.
69
Concurrently with the restrictions created by the principle that
in probate proceedings the superior court was still a separate and
special tribunal which did not have full probate jurisdiction, 70 there
emerged what on its face may seem to be a contradictory concept.
Since California no longer has a distinct probate court, and
65. Bush v. Lindsey, 44 Cal. 121, 124-25 (1872).
66. King v. Chase, 159 Cal. 420, 422-24, 115 P. 207, 208-09 (1911). No distinction
between deceased executors and administrators on the one hand, and deceased guardians on
the other, has been found. Cf. Zurfluh v. Smith, 135 Cal. 644, 67 P. 1089 (1902).
67. Security-First Nat'l Bank v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 749, 757-58, 37 P.2d 69,
73 (1934); Estate of Davis, 151 Cal. 318, 327, 86 P. 183, 186, reh'g denied, 90 P. 711
(1907).
68. Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323, 328, 67 P. 282, 284 (1902).
69. Id. at 329-30, 67 P. at 285 (based on the English Chancery practice relative to
decrees of the ecclesiastical courts).
70. Cf. Burris v. Kennedy, 108 Cal. 331, 337-38, 41 P. 458, 459 (1895). Supra note
58.
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superior courts have both probate and equity jurisdiction ...
whenever in the course of administration and settlement of estates,
our probate statutes are found to be inadequate to authorize and
accomplish all that a court of equity is authorized to do in such
cases, our superior courts may exercise their equity powers in
connection with and as incidental to their power in probate mat-
ters to the extent necessary to a complete administration and dis-
tribution of estates; provided, of course, nothing be done in
contravention of any statutory provision.
7'
This principle emerged from unsuccessful attacks on the consti-
tutionality of statutes expanding the probate jurisdiction by defining
as "probate matters" cases that had previously been equitable.
72
And the doctrine was extended by following the common-sense
proposition that "[a]ny contrary doctrine would permit the probate
court to be shorn of all power except what was directly conferred
upon it in the very words of the statutes." 73 Thus Estate of Bell held
that even though "the superior court sitting in probate is limited in
its jurisdiction," and despite the absence of specific statutory authority,
an executrix in a probate proceeding could defend against a creditor's
claim by asserting a defense of setoff.7" And although no statute pro-
vided for the procedure, the court in probate could order the distributee
to restore property erroneously distributed to her to the executors."
The power to make such an order was "inherent in the court" even
if the court was one of limited jurisdiction.76
The concepts of inherent powers and equitable powers were con-
joined in Estate of Charters.77 A trustee who had also been a
ward's guardian and had filed nine accounts in the guardianship
petitioned for instructions. The ward then contested the guardian's
third account on the ground that the guardian previously had a
conflict of interest with the ward which denied the ward effective
71. Verdier v. Roach, 96 Cal. 467, 478, 31 P. 554, 557-58 (1892); In re Burton, 93
Cal. 459, 463-64, 29 P. 36, 37 (1892).
72. Cf. In re Burton, 93 Cal. 459, 462-63, 29 P. 36, 37 (1892) (former grant of equity
jurisdiction to superior court, see supra text accompanying note 61, not violated by statute
requiring settlement of claims of assignees of heirs in the probate proceeding); Verdier v.
Roach, 96 Cal. 467, 479, 31 P. 554, 558 (1892) (contingent claims, formerly protected in
equity, barred if not presented in probate proceeding within statutory period).
73. Estate of Johnson, 4 Coffey Probate Decisions 499, 506 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1895).
74. Estate of Bell, 168 Cal. 253, 257, 141 P. 1179, 1180-81 (1914). The Court suggested
that the executrix could have asserted the setoff by intervention in the insolvency proceeding
in the superior court against the creditor. 168 Cal. at 258, 141 P. at 1181.
75. Heydenfeldt v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. 348, 351, 49 P. 210, 211 (1897).
76. Id.
77. 46 Cal. 2d 227, 293 P.2d 237 (1956).
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representation. 78 The court allowed the attack on the grounds that
since the probate court by statute had continuing jurisdiction over
the trust, 9 the superior court sitting in probate "could bring to its
aid the full equitable and legal powers with which as a superior
court it is invested." 80 Additionally, since the third account was
not res judicata against the ward, the court applied the general
rule: "A court has inherent power to set aside a decree for extrinsic
fraud when a party has been prevented from fully presenting his
case and there had therefore been no adversary trial of the issue.'",
But, since the meaning of "incidental" is less than precise, the
court in McPike v. Superior Court82 held that a statute which
permitted the superior court in probate to authorize an adminis-
trator to compromise a claim against an estate did not give the
court authority to compel the administrator to carry out the pro-
visions of the compromise. Although the court referred to the gen-
erality that a court in probate "has no other powers than those
given by statute and such incidental powers as pertain to it," it
relied equally on a comparison of mandatory and permissive pro-
bate provisions, and on the traditional reluctance to infer probate
jurisdiction "to try purely collateral matters with strangers. '" '83
There are occasional references to the "exclusive jurisdiction" of
the probate court. 84 These references are as evanescent as those
relative to the jurisdiction of the probate court in general and
"appear to be an overstatement." 85 Of course, if the probate pro-
ceeding provides a remedy that has no common law or traditional
equity counterpart, the probate jurisdiction is perforce exclusive.
86
If the probate proceeding provides an adequate remedy in lieu of
78. 46 Cal. 2d at 234, 236, 293 P.2d at 782-84. See Guardianship of DiCarlo, 3 Cal.
2d 225, 234-35, 44 P.2d 562, 566-67 (1935) (guardian's current accounts not res judicata).
79. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1120 (West 1981).
80. 46 Cal. 2d at 236, 293 P.2d at 783.
81. 46 Cal. 2d at 234, 293 P.2d at 783. On the difference between Charters and
Security-First Nat'l Bank v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 749, 37 P.2d 69 (1934), see Neubrand
v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 311, 322-23, 88 Cal. Rptr. 586, 593 (1970) (final orders
may not be attacked by motion in probate proceeding). But see Estate of Auslender, 53
Cal. 2d 615, 626 n.1, 349 P.2d 537, 542 n.1, 2 Cal. Rptr. 769, 774 n.1 (1960): "[I]nsofar
as that case [Security-First] holds that a probate court cannot set aside its prior order,
which order has become final, on the ground of extrinsic fraud, it appears to have been
impliedly overruled by Estate of Charters...
82. 220 Cal. 254, 30 P.2d 17 (1934).
83. McPike v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 254, 258-59, 30 P.2d 17, 18 (1934).
94. E.g., Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323, 328-29, 67 P. 282, 284 (1902); Schlyen v.
Schlyen, 43 Cal. 2d 361, 366, 373, 273 P.2d 897, 898, 904 (1954) (argument).
85. 7 B. WrrKiN, SUMMRY OF CALIFORNuA LAW, Wills & Probate § 235 (7th ed. 1974).
86. Smith v. Westerfield, 88 Cal. 374, 379, 26 P. 206, 207 (1891) (determination of
heirship).
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a former equitable remedy the probate jurisdiction becomes exclu-
sive because, on general principles, there is no need to resort to
equity. 7 Of course, the rules of territorial comity apply, so that
the superior court of one county may not interfere by a probate
proceeding or otherwise in a proceeding already pending in another
county."' Despite the generalization as to exclusivity, there are in-
stances where a superior court sitting in probate may have con-
current jurisdiction with itself sitting in some other capacity. 9 In
Schlyen v. Schlyen,90 before a will contest was brought to trial,
the contestants filed an action against the executrix alleging she
had defrauded the decedent. The court enforced a stipulation con-
solidating the probate and equity matters for trial and allowed them
to proceed simultaneously because in such a case the probate "ju-
risdiction is not exclusive, depending on the facts of the particular
case and may be waived." 9' Since the issue is jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the court can have jurisdiction over the same
subject matter in two capacities, the consolidation of the proceed-
ings is not merely a matter of agreement by the parties, but may
also be ordered by the court.92
What emerges from these cases is a general principle that if the
probate procedure does provide a remedy to vindicate an asserted
right, the probate procedure is exclusive because no other procedure
need be invoked. If the probate procedure does not provide a
remedy, the right may be vindicated by another procedure, which,
if need be, may proceed concurrently with the probate matter be-
fore the same judge. Except in the case where the probate pro-
cedure is provided to vindicate a right unknown to the common
law or equity, the absence of a probate remedy does not indicate
absence of a right.
87. King v. Chase, 159 Cal. 420, 424, 115 P. 207, 209 (1911); Turney v. Shattuck, 96
Cal. App. 590, 593, 274 P. 442, 444 (1920). The time and procedural restrictions of the
new remedy cannot be evaded by purporting to bring a suit in equity. Fisher v. Superior
Court, 23 Cal. App. 2d 528, 531, 73 P.2d 892, 894-95 (1937) (the statute allowing contest
of a will after probate "is both a statute conferring jurisdiction and a statute of repose").
Cf. Toland v. Earl, 129 Cal. 148, 153, 61 P. 914, 915 (1900).
88. Dungan v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. 98, 100-01, 84 P. 767, 768-69 (1906) ("When
any such [probate] court has acquired jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is exclusive"); Browne
v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 593, 597, 107 P.2d 1, 3 (1940) (superior court may not by
habeas corpus interfere with guardianship pending in another county).
89. Estate of Bell, 168 Cal. 253, 258, 114 P. 1178, 1181 (1914) (insolvency); Schlyen
v. Schlyen, 43 Cal. 2d 361, 378, 273 P.2d 897, 906 (1954) (equity).
90. 43 Cal. 2d 361, 273 P.2d 897 (1954).
91. Schlyen v. Schlyen, 43 Cal. 2d 361, 378, 273 P.2d 897, 906 (1954).
92. Neubrand v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 311, 322-23, 88 Cal. Rptr. 586, 593
(1970).
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The general principles are as applicable to guardianships as they
are to decedents' estates. Such statements as "[guardianship] pro-
ceedings in this state .. .are in probate," 93 and "in this state ...
probate proceedings are special in their nature and purely statutory
in their origin, ' 94 should not be read as limitations on the sub-
stantive rights of wards or conservatees. If read in the context in
which they were made-that in the absence of specific provisions
relative to guardianships and conservatorships, the provisions of
the Probate Code applicable to the administration of decedents'
estates "govern so far as they are applicable to like situations,' '9 -
it is clear such statements refer only to matters of procedure rather
than of substance. 96
In matters of substance the California Supreme Court recognized
that in guardianships the superior court sits as successors to the
English chancellors and delegees of the king, as parens patriae,
with broad powers to "zealously guard and scrupulously conserve
the interests of the incompetent." 97 Thus, even more in a guardi-
anship than in the case of a decedent, the court "may bring to
its aid 'the full equitable and legal powers with which as a superior
court is invested."' 9 Those powers are very broad indeed.99
One example of zeal in guarding the interests of an incompetent
is Estate of Harvey.100 The court refused to apply to a conservator
the narrow view of incidental powers it had applied to an admin-
istrator in McPike v. Superior Court.0' Instead, the court held that
93. Sullivan v. Dunne, 198 Cal. 183, 189, 244 P. 343, 345 (1926).
94. In re Bundy, 44 Cal. App. 466, 468, 186 P. 811, 812 (1919).
95. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2100 (West 1981) (formerly CAL. PROB. CODE § 1606 (Deering
1931)): "When not otherwise specially prescribed in this division, practice and procedure
and the making and entry of orders under this division shall be governed by the provisions
of Division III of this code, so far as they are applicable." (derived from CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1808 (Deering 1931)).
96. Estate of Dunphy, 158 Cal. 1, 3, 109 P. 627, 628 (1910).
97. Sullivan v. Dunne, 198 Cal. 183, 189-90, 244 P. 343, 345 (1926). See 5 W. HOLD-
sWORTH , A HSToRY oF ENOuSH LAW 314 (3d ed. 1945); 6 W. HOLDSWORrs, supra, at 648
(2d ed. 1937). Administration of decedents' estates, at least of personalty, has a different
origin. "Probate matters belonged to ecclesiastical jurisdiction . . . ." In re Moore, 72 Cal.
335, 340, 13 P. 880, 882 (1887). See also Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323, 329, 67 P. 282,
284 (1902); Toland v. Earl, 129 Cal. 148, 151, 61 P. 914, 914-15 (1900).
98. Guardianship of Cornaz, 8 Cal. 2d 347, 359, 65 P.2d 784, 790 (1937).
99. Equity does not wait upon precedent which exactly squares with the facts in
controversy, but will assert itself in those situations where right and justice would
be defeated but for its intervention.... The principles of equity ... are based
upon a Divine morality and possess an inherent vitality and capacity of expansion,
so as ever to meet the wants of a progressive civilization.
Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 2d 309, 331-32, 44 P.2d 547, 557-58 (1935).
100. 3 Cal. 3d 646, 477 P.2d 742, 91 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1970).
101. 220 Cal. 254, 30 P.2d 17 (1934); supra text accompanying note 83.
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despite the absence of express statutory authority, the court, as an
incident of its express authority to instruct the conservator, could
authorize the conservator of an ailing elderly recluse to travel to
Scotland to try to find relatives of the conservatee so that they
could render advice regarding his future care. 02
Another example of zealous protection of incompetents can be
derived from Burge v. City & County of San Francisco,'°' which
held that the mother with whom a minor was living, rather than
the father from whom she was divorced, had authority to com-
promise the minor's claim of damages for a personal injury. The
issue revolved around the scope of the word custody in the ap-
plicable statute.' 4 The court held: "Custody embraces the sum of
parental rights with respect to the rearing of the child, including
its care. It includes ... the right to direct his activities and make
decisions regarding his care and control, education, health and re-
ligion."10'
KEMP IN THE LIGHT OF CALFORNIA HISTORY AND JuDiciAL
PRECEDENT
Kemp can now be seen for what it is: a contrived opinion written
to support a preconceived result rather than to provide a result
which would conform to the law. It is a pastiche of errors, half-
truths, unwarranted extrapolations, reliance on the irrelevant, and
suppression of the relevant. The prior portions of this article pro-
vided some materials to show these statements are not simply bra-
zen assertions intended to convince by substituting rhetoric for
analysis. The balance of the article is what a pathologist might call
a microscopic examination of Kemp to demonstrate its morbidity.
Kemp involved a "Guardian's Petition for Guidance and Instruc-
tions under the Chancery Powers of the Court in re Therapeutic
Sterilization (Prob. Code 1400)."' 10 Former Probate Code section
1400107 was merely a definition of a guardian and a statement that
the court could regulate him. The reference to section 1400 in
connection with "chancery powers" in the caption of the petition
102. 3 Cal. 3d at 650, 477 P.2d at 744, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
103. 41 Cal. 2d 608, 262 P.2d 6 (1953).
104. Now CAL PROB. CODE § 3500 (a)(2) (West 1981) giving the "parent having the
care, custody, or control of the minor if the parents of the minor are living separate and
apart" authority to compromise the claim.
105. 41 Cal. 2d at 617, 262 P.2d at 12.
106. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 760, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
107. Quoted at length, id. at 761, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
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seems to be no more than the lifting of two sections of a California
practice text which explained the phrase as a device developed in
the absence of express authority for a guardian of a person, as
distinguished from a guardian of an estate, to petition for instruc-
tions.103 Kemp proceeded on the following bases:
[Ajuthority for the questioned order, if it exists, must be found
in the exercise by the probate court of its residual chancery powers
under the provisions of Probate Code § 1400 ... [But] the su-
perior court sitting in probate ... must look to express statutory
authorization for its powers and procedure.'0 9
Section 1400 was, obviously enough, insufficient.
The first of Kemp's omissions of relevant authority was its fail-
ure to consider former Probate Code section 1500, the then ap-
plicable statute, which provided, as it had for many years: "Every
guardian has the care and custody of the person of his ward.... ,,10
An easy speculation explains Kemp's suppression of section 1500.
Section 1500 was derived from former Code of Civil Procedure
section 1753 which provided that a guardian of a minor "is charged
with the custody of the ward, and must look to his support, health
and education.""' When section 1753 was moved to the Probate
Code, the reference to health was omitted. By Kemp's time how-
ever, custody, with regard to a parent, had been interpreted to
comprehend health,"12 and it would have been hard to argue that
a therapeutic, or a curative, sterilization was not within the mean-
ing of health. Had Kemp tried to distinguish between the use of
the word custody in the statutes relative to parents and those rel-
ative to guardians, and capitalized on the omission of the word
health in the guardianship statute, and had Kemp relied on its own
holding that express authority was required, a preposterous situa-
tion would have resulted-that a guardian not only had no duty
to safeguard his ward's health but no authority to do so. A true
reductio ad absurdum. Since both authority and common sense
would have negated the conclusion to which Kemp was contrived
108. 3 N. CONDEE, PROBATE COURT PRACTICE §§ 2213, 2214 (3d ed. 1977). Reliance by
counsel on Judge Condee's text can be inferred from the request for both "guidance and
instruction," since the text discussed the appropriate label. 3 N. CONDEE, supra, at 405-06.
Conservators and guardians of persons now have express authority to petition for instruc-
tions. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2359 (West 1981); 14 CAL. L. REvisioN Colsa'N REPORTS 543
(1978).
109. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 760-61, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
110. 1961 Cal. Stat. ch. 608, at 1757, the version current when Kemp was decided.
111. 1907 Cal. Stat. ch. 943 (amending former CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1753).
112. 41 Cal. 2d at 617, 262 P.2d at 12.
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to come, the obvious way to eliminate the problem posed by sec-
tion 1500 was to ignore it."3
Kemp continues with the portentous statement: "Under Califor-
nia Constitution (art. VI, sec. 5), superior courts have jurisdiction
of all probate matters."" 4 As authority Kemp cited Wood v. Roach
which stated: "By the Constitution of 1879 (art. VI, sec. 5), su-
perior courts were given jurisdiction of all matters of probate in
like manner as of cases at law or in equity. ' " 5 This was once
true, and Wood's statement was made in a historical context. But
Kemp, by changing the tense from past to present, transformed a
correct statement of history into an erroneous statement of current
fact, which exposes that Kemp was less than meticulous in its
treatment of authority and cannot be read at face value. In reality,
the constitution had been revised in 1928 to eliminate the specifi-
cation of superior court jurisdiction in various types of civil mat-
ters. At the time of Kemp, the relevant section of the constitution
was that adopted in 1966: "Superior courts have original jurisdic-
tion in all causes except those given by statute to other trial
courts."" 6 Thus Kemp's statement was an anachronism forty-two
years behind the times. Again, one can only speculate as to why
the statement was made. It may have been a mere error; or an
effort to inflate the stature of the opinion by giving it a consti-
tutional dimension; or a way to silently invoke the authority of
the old cases that had to consider whether there were distinctions
between probate and equitable jurisdiction."
7
What seems likely is that the reference to the nonexistent con-
stitutional jurisdiction was a disingenuous effort to dissemble the
scope of the equitable powers that the Supreme Court had held to
be incidental to probate jurisdiction. Kemp used two techniques of
dissimulation: omission and overstatement.
To support the proposition that the "jurisdiction and powers [of
the court in guardianships] are wholly statutory .... [and the court]
must look to express statutory authorization for its powers and
113. The question of interpretation was eliminated in 1979 by CAL PROB. CODE § 2353
(West 1981) providing in relevant part: "(a) ... the guardian has the same right as a
parent having legal custody of a child to give consent to medical treatment performed upon
the ward and to require the ward to receive medical treatment." Id.
114. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 761, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
115. 125 Cal. App. 631, 634, 14 P.2d 170, 171 (1932) (explaining Burris v. Kennedy,
108 Cal. 331, 41 P. 458 (1895); see supra text accompanying notes 56-62 & 70).
116. CAL. CoNsr. art. VI, § 10 (West Supp. 1985); compare id. art VI, § 5 (West 1954).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 60-69.
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procedure," ' 8 Kemp cited McPike v. Superior Court."9 McPike
does indeed say that in probate proceedings "the court has no
other powers than those given by statute and such incidental powers
as pertain to it."' 120 Kemp ignored this reference to incidental pow-
ers and omitted any reference to the fact that only four years
earlier, in a case involving a guardian's incidental authority, the
Supreme Court had declined to accept an argument based on
McPike.'2'
Kemp then confronted the very strong language in Guardianship
of Reynolds:'2 2 "Suffice it to say that in such matters [guardian-
ships] our probate courts stand in the same position as the court
of chancery, which court Blackstone described as being 'the su-
preme guardian and has superintendent jurisdiction over all the
infants of the Kingdom." ' ' 23 Reynolds cited Sullivan v. Dunne'2' which
said that although at common law guardianships had been "part of
the general jurisdiction of the court of chancery ... [s]uch proceedings
in this state, however, are in probate [emphasis in original].1 12  The
court in Sullivan further stated:
Nevertheless ... the Code of Civil Procedure, prescribing the
methods to be followed in matters of guardianship of insane and
incompetent persons and the powers of the courts in such pro-
ceedings, gives broad discretion, quite analogous to that vested in
courts of chancery, to conserve the best interests of their wards
(emphasis added). 26
Kemp did not mention Sullivan and disposed of Reynolds with
the bold assertion that "the probate court has no general equity
jurisdiction."' 27 The assertion was taken from Security-First Na-
tional Bank v. Superior Court28 and was made in the special con-
text of collateral attack on a final judgment in rem. 29 Not only
118. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 761, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
119. 220 Cal. 254, 30 P.2d 17 (1934).
120. 220 Cal. at 258, 30 P.2d at 18.
121. Estate of Harvey, 3 Cal. 3d 646, 477 P.2d 742, 91 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1970); see supra
text accompanying notes 100-02.
122. 60 Cal. App. 2d 669, 141 P.2d 498 (1943) (affirming order that guardian allow
grandparents to visit ward and to take ward for summer vacations).
123. 60 Cal. App. 2d at 673, 141 P.2d at 500.
124. 198 Cal. 183, 244 P. 343 (1926).
125. Id. at 189, 141 P. at 345.
126. Id. at 189, 244 P. at 345; see supra text accompanying notes 97 & 98.
127. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 762, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
128. 1 Cal. 2d 749, 757, 37 P.2d 69, 73 (1934).
129. Supra text accompanying notes 67 & 69, and supra notes 77-81.
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is the assertion unsupported in Security-First, it is followed almost
immediately by the qualification: "[the probate court] has the power,
however, to apply equitable and legal principles in aid of its func-
tions as a probate court."' 30 Kemp, of course, did not mention
the Supreme Court's note that on its facts Security-First appears
to have been impliedly overruled.' Instead, Kemp underrated the
scope of incidental powers by citing a case which, because the
relevant statutes required a different distribution, denied the court
authority to order payment of attorneys' fees from the corpus of
a testamentary trust. 3 2 The case is obviously irrelevant to the prob-
lem in Kemp-the incidental powers, not otherwise denied, that
may be implied from a general grant of authority-the same sort
of problem old Judge Coffey had stated so clearly and resolved
so judiciously more than a century ago.
33
Kemp compounded its other errors by stating "[t]he probate court
has exclusive jurisdiction of guardianship proceedings.' ' 34 The state-
ment was based on a case wherein the superior court in one county
was not allowed to interfere in a guardianship proceeding already
pending before the superior court in another county. 3 The reason
for the statement was to fortify Kemp's abridgment of the scope
of incidental powers of the court in probate, or, in other words,
to try to show that if a court sitting in probate did not have the
authority, the court could not have it in any other capacity. Kemp
did so by expanding a commonplace ruling on territorial comity
to apply to prohibit the superior court in one county from exer-
cising its probate and equity jurisdictions simultaneously. Further-
more, Kemp ignored language in Schlyen v. Schlyen, 36 a case cited
by Kemp, which read "[probate] jurisdiction is not exclusive, de-
pending on the facts of the particular case and may be waived.'
3 7
130. 1 Cal. 2d at 757, 37 P.2d at 73.
131. Estate of Auslender, 53 Cal. 2d 615, 626 n.1, 349 P.2d 537, 542 n.l, 2 Cal. Rptr.
769, 774 n.1 (1960); see supra note 81.
132. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 762, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 67 (citing Estate of Muhammad, 16
Cal. App. 3d 726, 94 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1971) (2-1 opinion)).
133. Supra note 73 and accompanying text.
134. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 761, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
135. Browne v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 593, 107 P.2d 1 (1940).
136. 43 Cal. 2d 361, 273 P.2d 897 (1954), cited in 43 Cal. App. 3d at 761, 118 Cal.
Rptr. at 66.
137. 43 Cal. 2d at 378, 273 P.2d at 906.
[I]t is concluded: ... (3) that when as here the issues pertain only to the rights
of parties in privity with the estate and do not involve the rights of third parties
or strangers to the estate the superior court sitting in probate has jurisdiction and
should adjudicate them, but that such jurisdiction is not exclusive, depending on
the facts of the particular case and may be waived ....
Id.
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Schlyen conformed to the precedents, 38 and to pragmatic judicial
administration:
Why should Judge Coffey, sitting in probate, be instructed by
Judge Coffey, sitting in a case in equity brought for that purpose?
If it is necessary or proper to appeal to a court of chancery, the
probate court is such a court, and the proceeding is in fact for
that purpose. It is the same court when sitting in matters of
probate, and may exercise all equity powers necessary for complete
administration.
39
Once uttered, Kemp's exaggerated implications derived from "ex-
clusive jurisdiction" were more than merely repeated in Guardi-
anship of Tulley. 140 Tulley articulates a proposition inherent in Kemp
that the denial of authority to order sterilization "is not predicated
on the eventuality whether the tribunal proceeds as a probate court
or a court of general jurisdiction ... [and cannot be based] on a
mere inference deduced from the general principles of common law
or the canons of equity jurisprudence."'
14'
Based on Sparkman v. McFarlin,42 although the court knew it
had been reversed,' 3 Tulley held that "in the absence of specific
statutory authority" no court could order sterilization of an in-
competent. 44 Despite the breadth and explicitness of its holding,
the court in Tulley thought it necessary to reiterate Kemp: "It is
well established that the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction of
guardianship." '4- Tulley's uncritical acceptance of Kemp is partial
evidence of the truth of Justice Holmes' sad reflection: "It is one
of the misfortunes of the law that ideas becomes encysted in phrases
and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis.'
46
KEMP'S ABUSE AND SUPPRESSION OF OTHER PRECEDENTS
The denuciation of Kemp does not end with the specification of
its abuses and misuses of California judicial precedents. Treatment
138. See supra text accompanying notes 71, 91 & 92, and supra note 64.
139. Toland v. Earl, 129 Cal. 148, 153, 61 P. 914, 915 (1900).
140. 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 705, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266, 270 (1978).
141. 83 Cal. App. 3d at 704, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
142. 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977).
143. 83 Cal. App. 3d at 701-02, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 268. Tulley says the reversal was
"on other grounds." But lack of statutory authority to order sterilization was not among
any other grounds. "Because the court over which Judge Stump presides is one of general
jurisdiction, neither the procedural errors he may have committed nor the lack of a specific
statute authorizing his approval of the [sterilization] petition in question rendered him liable
in damages for the consequences of his actions." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359-
60 (1978) (civil rights action against judge).
144. 83 Cal. App. 3d at 701, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 268.
145. 83 Cal. App. 3d at 705, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
146. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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of other authority in Kemp was equally unmeticulous. At one point
the opinion defies explication if not description. The opinion refers
to Welfare and Institutions Code section 7254 47 the then existent,
but since repealed, eugenic sterilization statute. 48 The statute au-
thorized sterilization of certain institutionalized incompetents, in-
cluding those who showed "marked departures from normal
mentality."'' 49 The procedure for sterilization was initiated by the
superintendent of the state hospital or state home, and after notice
to the patient and his parents, spouse, children, and guardian,
could be approved by the Director of Public Health. Judicial review
of the Director's decision to sterilize was not required unless one
of the notified persons objected. The court in Kemp stated what
seems clear: "This statute is not exclusive in that it applies only
to persons previously committed to state mental hospitals."' 50 But
then the court went on to say:
In view of the fact that the legislature has prescribed a com-
prehensive scheme requiring examination, notice, administrative
hearings, administrative review, and judicial review, it may be
concluded that the Legislature did not intend that sterilization of
the mentally retarded was to be carried out without meeting the
requirements imposed by this statute.'
5'
So, within the space of two paragraphs, Kemp contradicted itself.
In one paragraph the court said the statute is not exclusive and
in the next paragraph it said that it is. Kemp may be forgiven for
failing to realize that allowing sterilizations only of persons com-
mitted to state hospitals raised a serious question of underinclusion
under the equal protection clause. That problem had not yet been
recognized. 15 2 But Kemp cannot be forgiven for double-talk.
Nor can the Kemp decision be forgiven for purporting to support
its statement as to exclusivity by citing Smith v. Wayne, 53 which,
Kemp said, involved "a similar Michigan statute" and held "[t]he
147. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 762-63, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
148. The version in effect at the time of Kemp is 1971 Cal. Stat. ch. 1593, § 441, at
3371-72. See Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 150-53, 707 P.2d 760, 764-65,
219 Cal. Rptr. 387, 390-92 (1985) (statutory history).
149. 1971 Cal. Stat. ch. 1593, § 441, at 3371.
150. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 763, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
151. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 762-63, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
152. Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 369 (D. Conn. 1978) (state must make procedure
available for noninstitutionalized incompetents). But see Guardianship of Tulley, 83 Cal.
App. 3d 698, 705, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266, 270 (1978) (assumption of propriety of making
sterilization available only to institutionalized persons). Tulley was decided less than three
months after Ruby, so the Ruby opinion may not have been available to the Tulley court.
153. 231 Mich. 409, 426-27, 204 N.W. 140, 146 (1925).
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requirements of the statute . . . are jurisdictional, and no valid
order can be made without substantial compliance with them."
' 54
The Michigan statute was similar to former Welfare and Institu-
tions Code section 7254 only in that it related to eugenic sterili-
zations. But the Michigan statute was not limited to institutionalized
persons and did not involve any administrative procedure; the stat-
ute related only to a proceeding initiated in court and terminated
by a court order. The Smith court held that the statute was con-
stitutional but that the order of sterilization had to be reversed
because the lower court had not adhered to the required proce-
dures.' 55 Smith said nothing about exclusivity or about therapeutic,
as distinguished from eugenic, sterilizations. The Smith case is so
irrelevant to Kemp that to characterize the citation of Smith as
another of Kemp's dissimulations does not seem too harsh.
The most significant authority cited in Kemp is Wade v. Bethesda
Hospital,5 6 which denied defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment in a civil rights action against an Ohio judge for ordering a
sterilization without express statutory authority. If Kemp committed
any sin by citing Wade, it was pardonable because it involved a
rather esoteric point of federal law. The question in Wade con-
cerned the authority of the judge under the law of Ohio, but the
court declined to follow Ohio law as declared in In re Simpson.5 7
Instead, Wade based its decision on its interpretation of Holmes
v. Powers,58 a case involving only the law of Kentucky. To de-
termine state law, a federal court must follow the decision of a
lower state court "in the absence of more convincing evidence of
what the state law is."'5 9 However, it has also been held that if
there is no decision by the state's highest court, a federal court in
nondiversity cases need only give '.proper regard' to relevant rul-
ings of other courts of the state."' 6° In view of this uncertainty,
Kemp cannot be faulted for ignoring the point.
154. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 763, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
155. 231 Mich. at 425, 204 N.W. at 145.
156. 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971), cited and discussed in 43 Cal. App. 3d at
764, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 68-69. Wade is said to have been settled for "a substantial sum of
money." Burgdorf & Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the
Sterilization of Handicapped Persons, 50 TEmP. L.Q. 995, 1016 n.154 (1977). Its viability
as a current precedent since Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), is beyond the scope
of this article.
157. 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio Probate Ct. 1962) (trial court opinion).
158. 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
159. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177-78 (1940).
160. Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967). See HART & WECHSLER'S, Tiia
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM, 708-09, 768-69 (P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D.
Shapiro & H. Wechsler 2d ed. 1973).
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Kemp, however, should be called to account for its own mis-
leading interpretation of Holmes v. Powers. Kemp refers to Holmes
by stating "[tihe appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision
that such an operation [sterilization of an incompetent] could not
legally be performed."' 16' In fact, the Kentucky court held that the
petition to sterilize had been brought by the wrong parties and
expressly declined to decide what it would have done had the case
been brought by the proper party, a committee: "It may be (though
we do not decide) that a legally constituted committee could ex-
ercise such a choice [to sterilize an incompetent], but there has
been no inquest and there is no committee."' 62
Less than a year after Holmes, in Strunk v. Strunk, 63 the Ken-
tucky court confronted a case brought by a proper party. The
Strunks had two sons, Tommy, 28, married, employed, and a part-
time college student, and Jerry, 27, incompetent, with a mental
age of six, and institutionalized. Tommy was suffering from a fatal
kidney disease and needed a kidney transplant. No acceptable do-
nor could be found except his brother Jerry, who was "highly
acceptable." Their mother, as Jerry's committee, petitioned the
county court for authority to use Jerry as the donor, and the
county court granted her petition on the ground, among others,
that Jerry's "well-being would be jeopardized more severely by the
loss of his brother than by the removal of a kidney."' 64 Jerry's
guardian ad litem appealed first from the county court to the
chancellor, who affirmed, and then to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the chancellor.
Strunk was relevant to Kemp not merely on the general ground
that loss of a kidney, since it may be fatal if the remaining kidney
falls, is a procedure at least as drastic as the loss of ability to
procreate, but also on the particular ground that the Kentucky
court considered what in California would have been called the
relation between probate and equity jurisdiction:
In this state we have delegated substantial powers to committees
of persons of unsound minds ... and to county courts in their
supervision. However, ... these statutes were not intended to
divest the equity courts of their inherent common law powers.
161. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 765 n.2, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 69 n.2.
162. 439 S.W.2d at 580. In California usage, a "committee" is a guardian or conserv-
ator.
163. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
164. Id. at 146.
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These powers we have continued to exercise in spite of the ju-
risdiction granted to the county courts.
65
Nevertheless, Kemp does not mention Strunk. The omission cannot
be excused. Strunk was not only cited to the Kemp court, the case
was reprinted at length in the respondent's reply brief complete
with annotations.'" Thus, Kemp's suppression of Strunk can be
viewed as an admission by silence of the inability to distinguish the
cases. Considered with Kemp's other errors, such a view is not
unduly derogatory.
A RATIONALE FOR KEMP
Without condoning the flagrant violations of proper judicial tech-
nique in Kemp and the uncritical acceptance of Kemp in Tulley
and Conservatorship of Nieto, it is possible to explain the avidity
with which the courts sought the results in those cases. The fallacies
underlying the old eugenic sterilization statutes and the actual and
possible abuses under them had been exposed about a half century
before Kemp.' 67 About a year and one-half before Kemp a partic-
ularly flagrant and notorious example of abuse arose: the case of the
Relf sisters. Two Black children, aged 12 and 14, had been sterilized
at the instance of functionaries of a federally funded family planning
program in Alabama. The consent of their illiterate mother had been
procured either by coercion or trickery. The purpose seems to have
been to prevent the procreation of welfare clients. 68 Since the authority
to sterilize incompetents was open to such harrowing abuse, it is easy
165. 445 S.W.2d at 148.
166. Respondent's Reply Brief at 23-27, Appendix H at 683-95. See Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d
692 (1971).
167. E.g., the dissenting opinion of Wiest, J., in Smith v. Wayne, 231 Mich. 409, 428,
204 N.W. 140, 146 (1925); supra text accompanying notes 153-55. See Conservatorship of
Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 148, 707 P.2d 760, 762, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387, 389 (1985) ("the
longstanding, but discredited, practice of eugenic sterilization"). See also id. at 148 n.4,
152 n.8, 156 n.16, 707 P.2d at 762 n.4, 765 n.8, 768 n.16, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 389 n.4, 392
n.8, 395 n.16 (collecting some of the literature both before and after Kemp). Burgdorf &
Burgdorf, supra note 156 is the most cited article, but equally rewarding is Cynkar, Buck
v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1418 (1981).
168. See Newsweek, July 16, 1973, at 31, col. 1.; Time, July 23, 1973, at 50, cols. 1-
2; Ebony, Oct. 1973, at 150-52; Nation, Jan. 12, 1974, at 51-53. This list is merely illus-
trative, not definitive. See also Quality of Health Care-Human Experimentation, 1973:
Hearings on S. 2071, S. 2072 and H.R. 7724 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1496-503 (statement of Jos.
Levin, General Counsel, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, Alabama, accompanied
by Mr. and Mrs. Relf); Reif v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.C.D.C. 1974). The
current restrictions on the use of federal funds to finance the sterilization of incompetents,
42 C.F.R. §§ 50.206, 441.254 (1985), are a response to the Ref case, 43 Fed. Reg. 52,146
(1978).
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to see why Kemp and its progeny denied the authority to sterilize
even though the procedure could be used for the benevolent purposes
of preserving the mental or emotional health of an incompetent, or
even preserving the incompetent's physical health short of creating
"an unreasonable risk of death."' 69 In those cases the courts were
not mindful of Justice Story's admonition: "It is always a doubtful
course, to argue against the use or existence of a power, from the
possibility of its abuse."' 0 The courts silently adopted "slippery slope"
reasoning-they denied the authority because they feared that future
courts would not act wisely.' 7 ' The vice of these cases is that they
did not express-in Kemp actually suppressed and distorted-the
available empirical data, including judicial authority, upon which they
did and did not rely, and upon which the validity of the "slippery
slope" argument depends.'"
THE HAZARDS OF KEMP AS A SUBMERGED DERELICT
Natural questions include what difference does any of the fore-
going make? And why such an ado over historical materials? Con-
versatorship of Nieto is gone, 73 and Kemp and Tulley are inferen-
tially overruled. 174 The trouble is that they are only inferentially over-
ruled. Thus, some lawyer may find it expedient to argue they were
overruled on other grounds,'"7 that is, constitutional grounds rather
than interpretive ones. On this premise counsel could argue further
that Kemp and Tulley are still viable on their holdings that jurisdic-
tion of the superior court in probate is so exclusive and statutorily
limited that inferences should not be drawn as to the court's equitable
or incidental powers.
Problems of interpretation may arise. The Probate Code has
several references to the "medical treatment" of incompetents.
76
The code provides for the determination of the capacity of a con-
servatee as an adult to "give informed consent for medical treat-
ment."' 7 7 If the conservatee has been adjudicated to lack that
169. Cf. Maxon v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 626, 634, 185 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521
(1982); supra text accompanying note 24.
170. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 344 (1816).
171. Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HAgv. L. REV. 361 (1985).
172. Id. at 381-83.
173. Supra note 13.
174. Supra text following note 7.
175. Cf. supra note 132.
176. CAL PROB. CODE, §§ 1880, 2353, 2355, 2357, 3200-3211 (West 1981).
177. Id. § 1880.
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capacity, the conservator has exclusive authority to consent to med-
ical treatment and to require the conservatee to receive such med-
ical treatment whether or not the conservatee objects.'17 A guardian
has similar authority to consent to "medical treatment" of his ward
if the ward is under age 14.179 The Probate Code authorizes the
court to order medical treatment for an existing or continuing med-
ical condition for children 14 or older and for conservatees not
already adjudicated to lack capacity to give informed consent.8 0
The petition, for the order must state, among other matters, the
predicted outcome of the recommended course of treatment.',' Ad-
ditionally, the court may order the treatment only if it determines
from the evidence all of the following:
(1) The existing or continuing medical condition of the ward
or conservatee requires the recommended course of medical treat-
ment.
(2) If untreated, there is a probability that the condition will
become life-endangering or result in a serious threat to the phys-
ical health of the ward or conservatee.
(3) The ward or conservatee is unable to give an informed
consent to the recommended course of treatment.8 2
The code also authorizes the court to order the medical treatment
of an adult who does not have a conservator. 8 3 The language of
this grant of authority parallels that of the authority to order
medical treatment of incompetents not already adjudicated to lack
capacity to consent. Indeed, as to the need for a determination of
danger to life or serious threat to physical health, the language is
identical. 184
The denial of authority to order sterilization, which was appli-
cable to all of the foregoing grants of authority,8 5 was held un-
constitutional in Valerie N.'9 The case did not require any definition
of "medical treatment" as used in the Probate Code because ster-
ilization is, obviously, a form of medical treatment. The statutory
requirement of a threat to the "physical health of the ward or
178. Id. § 2355 (a).
179. Id. § 2353.
180. Id. § 2357.
181. Id. § 2357 (c)(4).
182. Id. § 2357 (h).
183. Id. §§ 3200, 3201.
184. Id. § 3208 (a).
185. Id. § 2356 (d).
186. Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 160, 707 P.2d 760, 771-72, 219
Cal. Rptr. 387, 398-99 (1985); supra notes 2-3.
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conservatee (emphasis added)"' 87 is not mentioned in the opinion.
But the term "habilitation" as used in the opinion is broad enough
to include mental or emotional health. 8" The court clearly intended
a broad application because the court stated that the conservators
could elect to authorize an abortion as a "means of avoiding the
severe psychological harm which assertedly would result from preg-
nancy" and, therefore, should not be denied "the one choice that
may be best for her ... contraception through sterilization."' 8 9
This conclusion silently assumes that the limitation of treatment to
promote physical, as distinguished from emotional or mental, health
is inapplicable to therapeutic sterilizations. If this limitation is in-
applicable to therapeutic sterilizations, why is it applicable to any
other procedure that may correct a condition not dangerous to life
but dangerous to emotional health, or to physical comfort, or to
any condition adverse to the best interests of the incompetent, such
as plastic surgery after gross disfigurement in a conflagration?1'9 If
the limitation is inapplicable, a situation similar to cases in which
a conservatee adjudicated to lack the capacity to give informed
consent arises, since the court may not order treatment without
finding that the conservatee is unable to consent to the recom-
mended treatment.' 9' When the conservatee has been adjudicated to
lack capacity, the conservator's authority is not limited to consid-
erations of danger to life, or the severity of the threat to health,
or to consideration only of physical health.' 92
But even if the limitation to danger to life or physical health is
read out of the statute, the problem of interpreting "treatment"
remains. Whether applicable or not, the very existence of the lim-
itation to conditions endangering life or seriously threatening phys-
ical health shows a legislative usage, if not intent, that restricts
treatment to life-prolonging medical management.
187. Supra text accompanying note 182.
188. Supra note 2.
189. 40 Cal. 3d at 160, 707 P.2d at 387, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
190. Cf. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (parental consent required
for plastic surgery on minor aged 15); compare CA. PROB. CODE § 2353 (b) (West 1981)
(requiring consent of both guardian and ward aged 14 or more, or a court order under id.
§ 2357).
191. Supra text accompanying note 182.
192. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355 (a) (West 1981). The conservator, however, may not violate
the conservatee's religious tenets that antedate the conservatorship, id. § 2355 (b), or place
the conservatee in a mental institution involuntarily, subject the conservatee to experimental
drugs or convulsive treatment, or treat in violation of the Natural Death Act ("living will"),
id. § 2356.
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Assume a ward or conservatee is not brain dead but is in a
deeply comatose state and either cannot or is unlikely to recover,
but is being kept alive on a support sytem. Assume further that
the guardian or conservator, as the case may be, wishes to dis-
continue the treatment, and that most of the ward's or conserva-
tee's relatives or family agree, but some relative disagrees. The
guardian files a petition under the provisions for court-ordered
medical treatment, 93 and the dissenting relatives intervene by filing
a petition to require the guardian to "obtain and consent to, spec-
ified medical treatment."'' 94 The court may be willing to assume
that the limitation to life endangering conditions and serious threats
to physical health has been inferentially eliminated by Valerie N.,193
but responds with an argument that in the total context of the
statute "treatment" means treatment to sustain life, not to ter-
minate life. Therefore, no statutory authority exists. Furthermore,
since Kemp and Tulley were not expressly overruled, the court
cannot resort -to general principles of common law or the canons
of equity jurisprudence. 96 What result? What this writer thinks the
result should be is obvious. But what the courts, which tolerated
Kemp for almost eleven years and then did not expressly overrule
it, will do, this author does not have the temerity to predict.
Baron Surrebutter: A hard case but hard cases make bad law.
Crogate: I don't know what you mean by that, Mr. Judge, but
I think bad law makes hard cases.
97
193. CAL PROB. CODE § 2357 (West 1981).
194. Id. § 2357 (i).
195. Supra text accompanying notes 186-92.
196. Supra text accompanying note 141, and supra note 99. But see 65 Op. Cal. Att'y
Gen. 417 (1982), disapproved in Dority v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. App. 3d 273, 280 n.4,
193 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292 (1983) (without explanation).
197. Hayes, Crogate's Case: A Dialogue in ye Shades on Special Pleading Reform, in
9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 417, 423 (3d ed. 1944). For the author
see id., at 414.
